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This paper studies the security of a recently-proposed chaos-based image encryp-
tion scheme, and points out the following problems: 1) there exist a number of
invalid keys and weak keys, and some keys are partially equivalent for encryp-
tion/decryption; 2) given one chosen plain-image, a subkey K10 can be guessed with
a smaller computational complexity than that of the simple brute-force attack; 3)
given at most 128 chosen plain-images, a chosen-plaintext attack can possibly break
the following part of the secret key: {Ki mod 128}10i=4, which works very well when
K10 is not too large; 4) when K10 is relatively small, a known-plaintext attack can
be carried out with only one known plain-image to recover some visual information
of any other plain-images encrypted by the same key.
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1 Introduction
Spurred by the rapid development of multimedia and network technologies,
multimedia data are being transmitted over networks more and more fre-
quently. As a result, content protection of multimedia data is urgently needed
in many applications, including both public and private services such as mil-
itary information systems and multimedia messaging systems (MMS). Al-
though any traditional data ciphers (such as DES and AES) can be used
to meet this increasing demand of information security, they cannot provide
satisfactory solutions to some special properties and requirements in many
multimedia-related applications. For example, one requirement is perceptual
encryption [1], meaning that the encrypted multimedia data can still be de-
coded by any standard-compliant codec and displayed, with a relatively low
quality, which cannot be realized by simply employing a traditional cipher. As
a response to this concern, a large number of specially-designed multimedia
encryption schemes have been proposed [2–8]. Meanwhile, security analysis on
the proposed schemes have also been developed, and some of these schemes
have been found insecure to a certain extent [9–13]. For more discussions
about multimedia data encryption techniques, readers are referred to some
recent surveys [14–18].
Since 2003, Pareek et al. [19–21] have proposed three different encryption
schemes based on one or more one-dimensional chaotic maps, among which
the one proposed in [21] was designed for image encryption. Recent cryptanal-
ysis results [22, 23] have shown that the two schemes proposed in [19, 20] are
not secure. The present paper focuses on the security analysis of the image
encryption scheme proposed in [21], and reports the following findings:
(1) There are several types of security problems with the secret key, and each
subkey is involved in at least one problem.
(2) One subkey K10 can be separately searched with a relatively small com-
putational complexity, even when only one chosen plain-image is given.
(3) The scheme is insecure against chosen-plaintext attack in the sense that
using 128 chosen plain-images may be enough to break part of the key.
The attack is especially feasible when K10 is not too large.
(4) When K10 is relatively small and one plain-image is known, a known-
plaintext attack can be used to reveal some visual information of any
other plain-images encrypted with the same secret key.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief
introduction to the image encryption scheme under study. Section 3 is the
main body of the paper, focusing on a comprehensive cryptanalysis, with
both theoretical and experimental results. In the last section, some concluding
(http://www.hooklee.com).
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remarks and conclusions are given.
2 The image encryption scheme under study
In this scheme, the plaintext is a color image with separate RGB channels.
The plain-image is scanned in the raster order, and then divided into 16-pixel
blocks. The encryption and decryption procedures are performed blockwise on
the plain-image. Without loss of generality, assume that the size of the plain-
image is M ×N , and that MN can be exactly divided by 16. Then, the plain-
image I can be represented as a 1-D signal {I(i)}MN−1i=0 with Nb = MN/16
blocks, namely, I = {I(16)(k)}Nb−1k=0 , where I(16)(k) = {I(16k + i)}15i=0. Simi-
larly, the cipher-image is denoted by I∗ = {I∗(16)(k)}Nb−1k=0 , where I∗(16)(k) =
{I∗(16k + i)}15i=0.
The secret key of the encryption scheme under study is an 80-bit integer and
can be represented as K = K1 · · ·K10, where each subkey Ki ∈ {0, . . . , 255}.
Two chaotic systems are involved in the encryption scheme, and both are
realized by iterating the Logistic map
f(x) = µx(1− x), (1)
where µ is the control parameter and fixed to be 3.9999. One chaotic map
runs globally throughout the whole encryption process, while another one
runs locally for the encryption of each 16-pixel block. The initial condition of
the global chaotic map is determined by the six subkeys K4 ∼ K9 as follows:
X0 =
(∑6
i=4Ki · 28(i−4)
224
+
∑9
j=7((Kj mod 16) + bKj/16c)
96
)
mod 1, (2)
and the local chaotic map corresponding to each block is initialized according
to selected chaotic states of the global map. For the k-th block I(16)(k), the
encryption process can be described by the following steps.
• Step 1: Determining the initial condition of the local chaotic map. Iterate
the global chaotic map until 24 chaotic states within the interval [0.1, 0.9)
are obtained. Denoting these chaotic states by {Xˆj}24j=1, generate 24 integers
{Pj}24j=1, where Pj = b24(Xˆj−0.1)/0.8c+1. 1 Then, calculate B2 =
∑3
i=1Ki ·
1 In Sec. 2 of [21], the interval is [0.1, 0.9] and Pj = b23(Xˆj−0.1)/0.8c+1. However,
following this process, Pj = 24 when and only when Xˆj = 0.9, which becomes a rare
event and conflicts with the requirement that Pj has a roughly uniform distribution
over {1, . . . , 24}. Therefore, in this paper we changed the original process in [21] to
a more reasonable one. Note that such a change does not affect the security analysis
of the encryption scheme.
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28(i−1) and set the initial condition of the local chaotic map as
Y0 =
(
B2 +
∑24
j=1B2[Pj] · 2j−1
224
)
mod 1, (3)
where B2[Pj] denotes the Pj-th bit of B2.
• Step 2: Encrypting the k-th block I(16)(k). For each pixel in the block, iterate
the local chaotic map to obtainK10 consecutive chaotic states {Yˆj}K10j=1 which
fall into the interval [0.1,0.9), and then encrypt the RGB values of the
current pixel according to the following formulas:
R∗=E1(R) = gK4,K5,K7,K8,YˆK10 ◦ · · · ◦ gK4,K5,K7,K8,Yˆ1(R), (4)
G∗=E2(G) = gK5,K6,K8,K9,YˆK10 ◦ · · · ◦ gK5,K6,K8,K9,Yˆ1(G), (5)
B∗=E3(B) = gK6,K4,K9,K7,YˆK10 ◦ · · · ◦ gK6,K4,K9,K7,Yˆ1(B), (6)
where ◦ denotes the composition of two functions and ga0,b0,a1,b1,Y (x) is a
function under the control of Y as shown in Table 1.
• Step 3: Updating subkeys K1, . . . , K9. Perform the following updating oper-
ation for i = 1 ∼ 9:
Ki = (Ki +K10) mod 256. (7)
Table 1
The definition of ga0,b0,a1,b1,Y (x), where x denotes the bitwise complement of x, and
⊕ denotes the bitwise XOR operation.
Y ∈ ga0,b0,a1,b1,Y (x)= g−1a0,b0,a1,b1,Y (x)=
[0.10, 0.13) ∪ [0.34, 0.37) ∪ [0.58, 0.62) x = x⊕ 255
[0.13, 0.16) ∪ [0.37, 0.40) ∪ [0.62, 0.66) x⊕ a0
[0.16, 0.19) ∪ [0.40, 0.43) ∪ [0.66, 0.70) (x+ a0 + b0) mod 256 (x− a0 − b0) mod 256
[0.19, 0.22) ∪ [0.43, 0.46) ∪ [0.70, 0.74) x⊕ a0 = x⊕ (a0 ⊕ 255) = x⊕ a0
[0.22, 0.25) ∪ [0.46, 0.49) ∪ [0.74, 0.78) x⊕ a1
[0.25, 0.28) ∪ [0.49, 0.52) ∪ [0.78, 0.82) (x+ a1 + b1) mod 256 (x− a1 − b1) mod 256
[0.28, 0.31) ∪ [0.52, 0.55) ∪ [0.82, 0.86) x⊕ a1 = x⊕ (a1 ⊕ 255) = x⊕ a1
[0.31, 0.34) ∪ [0.55, 0.58) ∪ [0.86, 0.90] x = x⊕ 0
The decryption procedure is similar to the above encryption procedure, except
that Eqs. (4)∼(6) in Step 2 are replaced by the following ones:
R=E−11 (R
∗) = g−1
K4,K5,K7,K8,Yˆ1
◦ · · · ◦ g−1
K4,K5,K7,K8,YˆK10
(R∗), (8)
G=E−12 (G
∗) = g−1
K5,K6,K8,K9,Yˆ1
◦ · · · ◦ g−1
K5,K6,K8,K9,YˆK10
(G∗), (9)
B=E−13 (B
∗) = g−1
K6,K4,K9,K7,Yˆ1
◦ · · · ◦ g−1
K6,K4,K9,K7,YˆK10
(B∗), (10)
where g−1a0,b0,a1,b1,Y (x) is the inverse function of ga0,b0,a1,b1,Y (x) with respect to
x as shown in Table 1.
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3 Cryptanalysis
In this section, we report our cryptanalysis results about the image encryption
scheme under study. These include a comprehensive analysis on invalid keys,
weak keys and partially equivalent keys, a chosen-plaintext attack to break
K10, a chosen-plaintext attack to break {Ki mod 128}10i=4, a known-plaintext
attack, and some other minor security problems.
3.1 Two properties of the scheme
To facilitate the description of the discussion below, we first point out two
properties of the scheme under study in this subsection. One is about the
subkey updating mechanism, and the other is about the essential equivalent
presentation form of the encryption function.
To improve the security of the scheme, an updating mechanism is introduced
for subkeys in Eq. (7) of [21]. Because the updating process is performed in
a finite-state field, the sequence of each updated subkey produced by such a
mechanism is always periodic (see Fact 1 below). As a result, the sequence of
the dynamic keys is also periodic. Assuming that the period is T , the Nb plain
pixel-blocks {I(16)(k)}Nb−1k=0 can be divided into T separate sets according to the
values of these dynamically updated subkeys:
{
Ij =
NT−1⋃
k=0
I(16)(T · k + j)
}T−1
j=0
,
where NT = dNb/T e. For blocks in the same set Ij, all the updated subkeys
are identical. In other words, for each set Ij (1/T of the whole plain-image)
one can consider that the secret key is fixed. Since 1/T of a plain-image may
be enough to reveal essential visual information, one can turn to break any
set Ij without considering the updating mechanism.
Fact 1 For x, a ∈ {0, . . . , 255}, the integer sequence {y(i) = (x + ai) mod
256}∞i=0, has period T = 256/ gcd(a, 256).
With respect to the encryption function, one can see from Table 1 that each
encryption subfunction is represented in one of the following two formats:
(1) ga0,b0,a1,b1,Y (x) = x⊕ α, where α ∈ {0, 255, a0, a1, a0, a1};
(2) ga0,b0,a1,b1,Y (x) = xu β, where xu β denotes (x+ β) mod 256 (the same
hereinafter), and β ∈ {a0 u b0, a1 u b1} ⊂ {0, · · · , 255}.
Because (x⊕α1)⊕α2 = x⊕(α1⊕α2) and (xuβ1)uβ2 = xu(β1uβ2), consecutive
encryption subfunctions of the same kind can be combined together, and those
with α = 0 or β = 0 can be simply ignored. As a result, each encryption
function Ei(x) is a composition of len ≤ K10 subfunctions: {Gj(x)}lenj=1, where
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Gj(x) = x⊕αdj/2e or xuβdj/2e, andGj(x),Gj+1(x) are encryption subfunctions
of different kinds. According to the types of G1(x) and Glen(x), Ei(x) has four
different formats:
(1) Ei(x) = ((· · · ((xu β1)⊕ α1) · · · )⊕ αd(len−1)/2e)u βdlen/2e;
(2) Ei(x) = ((· · · ((xu β1)⊕ α1) · · · )u βd(len−1)/2e)⊕ αdlen/2e;
(3) Ei(x) = ((· · · ((x⊕ α1)u β1) · · · )⊕ αd(len−1)/2e)u βdlen/2e;
(4) Ei(x) = ((· · · ((x⊕ α1)u β1) · · · )u βd(len−1)/2e)⊕ αdlen/2e.
Note that len is generally less than K10. Assuming that {Yi} distributes uni-
formly over the interval [0.1,0.9], we can get the following inequality:
Prob[len = K10] ≤
2 · (
5
8
· 1
4
)
K10
2 , when K10 is even,
(5
8
· 1
4
)bK102 c(5
8
+ 1
4
), when K10 is odd.
(11)
From the above equation, we can see that the probability decreases exponen-
tially asK10 increases. Because it is difficult to exactly estimate the probability
that len is equal to a given value less than K10, we performed a number of
random experiments for a 512×512 plain-image to investigate the possibilities.
Figure 1 shows a result of 100 random keys when K10 = 66.
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56 61 66
100
101
102
103
104
105
Upper bound
Lower bound
Fig. 1. The number of subfunctions composed of len subfunctions, when K10 = 66
and other subkeys were generated randomly for 100 times.
Since Gj(x) is a composition of multiple functions ga0,b0,a1,b1,Y (x) of the same
kind, and since that a0 ⊕ a1 = a0 ⊕ a1 = a0 ⊕ a1 ⊕ 255 and a0 ⊕ a1 = a0 ⊕ a1,
one can easily deduce that
αi ∈ A = {255, a0, a1, a0 ⊕ 255, a1 ⊕ 255, a0 ⊕ a1, a0 ⊕ a1 ⊕ 255} (12)
and
βi ∈ B = {z1(a0 u b0)u z2(a1 u b1)|z1, z2 ∈ {0, · · · , K10} and z1 + z2 ≤ K10} .
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Note that A has an interesting property: ∀x1, x2 ∈ A∪{0}, x1⊕x2 ∈ A∪{0}.
This property concludes that
⊕
i αi ∈ A ∪ {0}, which will be used later in
Sec. 3.5 for chosen-plaintext attack.
3.2 Analysis of the key space
In this subsection, we report some invalid keys, weak keys and partially equiv-
alent keys existing in the encryption scheme under study. Here, an invalid
key means a key that cannot ensure the successful working of the encryption
scheme, a weak key is a key that corresponds to one or more security defects,
and partially equivalent keys generate the same encryption result for a cer-
tain part of the plain-image. When estimating the key space, invalid keys and
weak keys should be excluded, and all keys that are partially equivalent to
each other should be counted as one single key [24, Sec. 3.2].
3.2.1 Invalid keys with respect to K4 ∼ K9
When X0 = 0, the global chaotic map will fall into the fixed point 0, which dis-
ables the encryption process due to the lack of chaotic states lying in [0.1, 0.9].
Now, let us see when X0 = 0 can happen.
Observing Eq. (2), one can see that X0 = 0 is equivalent to∑6
i=4Ki · 28(i−4)
224
≡ −FP
(∑9
j=7((Kj mod 16) + bKj/16c)
96
)
(mod 1),
where FP(x) denotes the floating-point value of x. Because 0 ≤ ∑6i=4Ki ·
28(i−4) < 224 and 0 ≤ ∑9j=7((Kj mod 16) + bKj/16c) ≤ 15 · 6 = 90 < 96, one
can further simplify the above equation as follows:
∑6
i=4Ki · 28(i−4)
224
= 1− FP
(∑9
j=7((Kj mod 16) + bKj/16c)
)
96
. (13)
By the fact that
∑6
i=4
Ki·28(i−4)
224
mod 2−24 = 0, the following equality also holds:
FP
(∑9
j=7((Kj mod 16) + bKj/16c)
)
96
mod 2−24 = 0.
By checking all the 91 possible values of
∑9
j=7((Kj mod 16) + bKj/16c), one
can easily get the following result:
9∑
j=7
((Kj mod 16) + bKj/16c) = 3C, (14)
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where C ∈ [0, 30]. In this case,
1− FP
(∑9
j=7((Kj mod 16) + bKj/16c)
96
)
= 1− C
32
.
Substituting the above equation into Eq. (13), one has
6∑
i=4
Ki · 28(i−4) = 219(32− C). (15)
As a result, any key that satisfies Eqs. (14) and (15) simultaneously can lead
to X0 = 0. The number of such invalid subkeys (K4, · · · , K9) can be calculated
to be 5592406 = 222.415, where 5592406 = d166/3e is the number of distinct
values of (K7, K8, K9) satisfying Eq. (14), calculated according to the following
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Given an n-dimensional vectorA = (a1, · · · , an) ∈ {0, · · · , 15}n,
the number of distinct values of A that satisfy (a1 + · · · + an) mod 3 = 0, 1
and 2 are d16n/3e, b16n/3c and b16n/3c, respectively.
Proof : This proposition can be proved by mathematical induction.
When n = 1, one can easily verify that the number of distinct values of A
that satisfy a1 mod 3 = 0, 1, 2, are 6, 5, 5, respectively. Since 6 = d16/3e and
5 = b16/3c, the proposition is true.
Assuming that the position is true for 1 ≤ n ≤ k, we prove the case for n =
k+1. First, rewrite a1+· · ·+ak+1 as Ak+ak+1, where Ak = a1+· · ·+ak. Then,
observe that (Ak + ak+1) mod 3 = 0 is equivalent to Ak ≡ −ak+1 (mod 3).
Thus, the number of distinct values of A that satisfying Ak + ak+1 mod 3 = 0
is the following sum:
N [(Ak + ak+1) mod 3 = 0]= d16k/3e · d16/3e+ 2b16k/3c · b16/3c
=(b16k/3c+ 1) · d16/3e+ 2b16k/3c · b16/3c
=16 · b16k/3c+ 6.
Assume 16k = (15 + 1)k = 3C + 1. Then, 16k+1 = 48C + 16 and d16k+1/3e =
16C + d16/3e = 16C + 6. Then 16 · b16k/3c + 6 = 16C + 6 = d16k+1/3e.
Going through a similar process, one can easily get N [(Ak + ak+1) mod 3 =
1] = N [(Ak+ak+1) mod 3 = 2] = b16k+1/3c. This completes the mathematical
induction, hence finishes the proof of the proposition. 
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3.2.2 Invalid keys with respect to K1 ∼ K3
For a given block I(16)(k), if Y0 = 0, the local chaotic map will fall into the fixed
point 0, which will also disable the encryption process of the corresponding
block. According to Eq. (3), Y0 = 0 when the following equality holds:
B2 + 24∑
j=1
B2[Pj] · 2j−1
 mod 224 = 0,
Since 0 ≤ B2 = ∑3i=1Ki · 28(i−1) < 224 and 0 ≤ ∑24j=1B2[Pj] · 2j−1 < 224, the
above equality can be simplified as follows:
24∑
j=1
B2[Pj] · 2j−1 = 224 −B2. (16)
Assuming that Pj distributes uniformly in {1, · · · , 24}, B2 and (224−B2) have
m and n 0-bits, respectively, the probability for Eq. (16) to hold is
ps =
(
m
24
)n
·
(
24−m
24
)24−n
=
mn(24−m)24−n
2424
.
The relationship between the values of ps and (25m + n) is shown in Fig. 2,
from which one can see that the probability is not negligible for some values of
(m,n). In fact, because ps > 0 holds for any value of (m,n), we can say that
any key is invalid from the strictest point of view. To resolve this problem,
the original encryption scheme must be amended. One simple way to do so
is setting Y0 to be a pre-defined value once Y0 = 0 occurs. In the following
discussions of this paper and all experiments involved, we set Y0 = 1/2
24 when
such an event occurs.
0 48 96 144 192 240 288 336 384 432 480 528 576 624
10−35
10−30
10−25
10−20
10−15
10−10
10−5
100
25m+n
p s
Fig. 2. The value of ps with respect to the value of (25m + n), where
m,n ∈ {0, · · · , 24}.
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3.2.3 Weak keys with respect to K10
In the encryption scheme under study, the update process of subkeys K1 ∼ K9
and the number of subfunctions ga0,b0,a1,b1,Y (x) in each encryption function are
both controlled by the subkey K10. In the following, we discuss two weak-key
problems with respect to K10, which correspond to the above two processes
controlled by K10, respectively.
From Fact 1, one can see that the update of subkeys K1 ∼ K9 has an inherent
weakness, i.e., the possible values for the period of the sequence of the updated
subkeys is 2i, i = 1 ∼ 8. For some values of K10, this period can be very small,
which weakens the updating mechanism considerably. The worst situation
occurs when K10 = 128, which corresponds to period two. From the most
conservative point of view, T should take the maximal value 256, which means
that K10 should be an odd number.
The other problem deals with the number of subfunctions ga0,b0,a1,b1,Y (x) in
each encryption function. When K10 = 1, the probability for a pixel to remain
unchanged is 1/8 (under the assumption that Yi distributes uniformly in the
chaotic interval). Though the probability seems quite large, our experiments
have shown that very little visual information leaks in the cipher-image. When
K10 ≥ 2, experiments have shown that it is almost impossible to distinguish
any visual pattern from the cipher-image. As a result, in this case there exists
only one major weak key: K10 = 1. To avoid other potential security defects,
K10 ≥ 8 is suggested.
3.2.4 Weak keys with respect to K4 ∼ K9
Observing Table 1, one can see that the encryption subfunction ga0,a1,b0,b1,y
(x) = x or x¯ when the following requirements are satisfied:
a0, a1 ∈ {0, 255} and a0 + b0 ≡ a1 + b1 ≡ 0 (mod 256). (17)
For the sub-image Ij, if the subkeys corresponding to one encryption function
Ei(x) satisfy the above requirements, Ei(x) will also be x or x¯. Assuming that
the chaotic trajectory of the local chaotic map has a uniform distribution in
the interval [0.1, 0.9], the probability of ga0,a1,b0,b1,y(x) = x¯ is p = 3/8. Then,
according to Proposition 2 given below (note that x¯ = x ⊕ 255), ∀i = 1 ∼
3, the probabilities of Ei(x) = x¯ and Ei(x) = x are (1 − (1/4)K10)/2 and
(1+(1/4)K10)/2, respectively. This means that about half of all plain-pixels in
Ij are not encrypted at all, which may reveal some visual information about
the plain-image. As an example, when K = “3C1DE8FF0151FF012840”
(which corresponds to T = 4), one of our experiments showed that 49.9% of
all the pixels in I0 were not encrypted (see Fig. 3 for the encryption result).
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a) b)
Fig. 3. The encryption result when K = “3C1DE8FF0151FF012840” (represented
in hexadecimal format, the same hereinafter): a) the red channel of the plain-image
“Lenna”; b) the red channel of the cipher-image. For the other two color channels
we have obtained similar results.
Proposition 2 Given n > 1 functions, f1(x), . . . , fn(x), assume that each
function is x⊕a with probability p and is x with probability 1−p, where a ∈ Z.
Then, the probability of the composition function F (x) = f1◦· · ·◦fn(x) = x⊕a
is P = (1− (1− 2p)n)/2.
Proof : Assume that k = dn/2e. Then, n = 2k if it is an even integer and
n = 2k − 1 when it is odd. To ensure F (x) = f1 ◦ · · · ◦ fn(x) = x ⊕ a, the
number of subfunctions that are equal to x⊕ a should be an odd integer. So,
P =
k∑
i=1
(
n
2i− 1
)
p2i−1(1− p)n−(2i−1)
=(1− p)n ·
k∑
i=1
(
n
2i− 1
)
(p/(1− p))2i−1
=(1− p)n · (1 + p/(1− p))
n − (1− p/(1− p))n
2
= (1− (1− 2p)n)/2.
This completes the proof of the proposition. 
By letting Eq. (17) hold for the three encryption functions E1(x), E2(x) and
E3(x), we found a list of weak keys of this kind, as shown in Table 2.
3.2.5 Partially equivalent keys with respect to K7 ∼ K9: Class 1
Observing Eq. (2), one can see that the value of X0 remains unchanged if the
following segments of K7, K8, K9 exchange their values: K7 mod 16, bK7/16c,
K8 mod 16, bK8/16c, K9 mod 16, bK9/16c. Now let us find out what will
happen if we exchange K9 mod 16 and bK9/16c, i.e., exchange the upper half
and the lower half of K9. In this case, since the encryption of the red value
11
Table 2
Some weak keys that cause leaking of visual information.
Weak keys Visual information leaked from
(K4,K5), (K7,K8) ∈ {(0, 0), (255, 1)} Channel R
(K5,K6), (K8,K9) ∈ {(0, 0), (255, 1)} Channel G
(K6,K4), (K9,K7) ∈ {(0, 0), (255, 1)} Channel B
(K4,K5,K6,K7,K8,K9) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) the whole plain-image
of each pixel is independent of K9, the red channel of the cipher-image will
remain unchanged. Similar results also exist for K7 and K8, which correspond
to unchanged blue and green channels of the plain-image, respectively. This
problem reduces the subkey-space of (K7, K8, K9) from 256
3 to (16 + (256 −
16)/2)3 = 1363.
3.2.6 Partially equivalent keys with respect to K7 ∼ K9: Class 2
As remarked in Sec. 3.1, each encryption subfunction ga0,a1,b0,b1,Y (x) can be
represented in one of the following two formats: x⊕α and xuβ. The following
two facts about ⊕ and u will lead us to construct another class of partially
equivalent keys.
Fact 2 ∀ a ∈ {0, . . . , 255}, a⊕ 128 = au 128.
Fact 3 ∀ a, b ∈ Z, (a⊕ 128)u b = (au b)⊕ 128.
Fact 3 means that a change in the MSB (most significant bit) of x, a0, a1, b0,
b1 of any encryption subfunction ga0,a1,b0,b1,Y (x) is equivalent to XORing 128
on the output of the composition function Ei(x).
Next, Fact 3 is used to figure out the second class of partially equivalent keys
about K7 ∼ K9. First, choose any two subkeys from K7 ∼ K9. Without loss
of generality, let us take K7 and K8. Then, given a secret key K that satisfies
K7 < 128 and K8 ≥ 128 (or, K7 ≥ 128 and K8 < 128), let us change it into
another key K˜ by setting K˜7 = K7⊕128 and K˜8 = K8⊕128. From Eq. (2), it
is easy to see that X0 remains the same for the two keys. This means that both
the global and the local chaotic maps have the same dynamics throughout the
encryption procedure for the two keys, and that the difference on ciphertexts
is determined only by the MSB-changes of K7 and K8. In the following, to
analyze the influence of the MSB-changes on the ciphertexts, we consider the
three color channels separately.
First, consider the encryption process of the green channel of the plain-image,
in which K7 is not involved at all. Assuming that the chaotic trajectory {Yi}
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distributes uniformly within the interval [0.1, 0.9], the probability that K8 has
an effect on each encryption subfunction is p = 3/8. If K8 appears for an
even number of times in the total K10 encryption subfunctions, then the value
of E2(G) will remain the same for the two keys K and K˜; otherwise, E2(G)
changes its MSB. Thus, using the same deduction as given in the proof of
Proposition 2, the probability that E2(G) remains unchanged can be calcu-
lated to be P2 = (1 + (1 − 2p)K10)/2 = (1 + 4−K10)/2. This means that more
than half of all green pixel values in the ciphertexts are identical in probability
for the two keys K and K˜.
For the blue channel,K8 is not involved in the encryption process. So, following
a similar deduction, the probability that E3(B) remains unchanged is P3 =
(1 + 4−K10)/2 = P2.
For the red channel, both K7 and K8 are involved, but their differences are
neutralized for the encryption subfunction xu (K7 +K8). So, the probability
that the differences in K7 and K8 have an effect on the ciphertext is reduced
to be p = 2/8 = 1/4. Thus, the probability that E1(R) remains unchanged
becomes P1 = (1 + 2
−K10)/2 > P2 = P3.
Combining all the above analyses together, it is expected that more than half
of all pixel values in the cipher-images will be identical for the two keys K and
K˜. In addition, for other different pixel values, the XOR difference is always
equal to 128. By enumerating all possibilities about this security problem, one
can conclude that the subkey-space of (K7, K8, K9) is reduced from 256
3 to
4 · 1283 = 2563/2.
To verify the above theoretical results, we have carried out some experiments
for a plain-image of size 512× 512. One result is shown in Fig. 4, in which the
number of identical pixel values in red, green and blue channels are 131241
(50.06%), 130864 (49.92%) and 131383 (50.12%), respectively.
a) b) c)
Fig. 4. The decryption result with partially equivalent keys of Class
2: a) the plain-image “Lenna”; b) the cipher-image corresponding to
K = “1A93DF25CF78DC44E160”; c) the decryption result of subfigure b with
a different key K˜ = “1A93DF25CF785CC4E160”.
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that there exists an internal relationship be-
tween the sub-images Ij and Ij+T/2, where j ∈ {0, · · · , T/2 − 1}, which can
be easily deduced from the following fact about the updating process of the
subkeys: Ki+K10 ·T/2 = Ki+128 ·K10/ gcd(K10, 256) ≡ Ki+128 = Ki⊕128
(mod 256).
3.2.7 Reduction of the key space
Based on the above analyses, we now summarize the influence of invalid, weak
and equivalent keys on the key space in Table 3. According to the table, one
can roughly estimate that the size of key space is reduced to 275, which is
somewhat smaller than 280 (the one claimed in [21, Sec. 3.3]).
Table 3
Reduction of the key space due to the existence of invalid keys, weak keys and
partially equivalent keys.
Subkeys Size of reduced subkey-space Reason
K1 ∼ K3 - Y0 = 0
K4 ∼ K9 248 − 5592406 ≈ 248 X0 = 0
K7 ∼ K9 1363/2 = 220.2624 Equivalent key of Classes 1 and 2
K10 < (255− 128− 1) = 126 Weak keys about K10
3.3 Guessing K10 and {Ki}9i=1 separately
The encryption process of the first block I(16)(0) depends only on the secret
values Y0 andK10. In other words, for the first block one can consider (Y0, K10)
as an equivalent to the original key K. Then, by guessing the value of (Y0, K10)
one can get the value of K10 with complexity O(2
32). Thus, the other subkeys
can be separately guessed with complexity O(272). The total complexity of
such an enhanced brute-force attack is O(232+272) = O(272), which is smaller
than O(280), the expected complexity of a simple brute-force attack.
3.4 Guessing K10 with a chosen plain-image
As remarked in Sec. 3.1, all 16-pixel blocks in Ij =
⋃NT−1
k=0 I
(16)(T · k + j)
are encrypted with the same subkeys. If these blocks also correspond to the
same values of Y0, then all the three encryption functions for the R, G, B
channels will become identical. Precisely, given two identical blocks, I(16)(k0)
and I(16)(k1), one can see that the corresponding cipher-blocks will also become
identical, if the following two requirements are satisfied:
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(A) the distance of the two blocks is a multiple of T , i.e., (k0 − k1) | T ;
(B) Y
(k0)
0 = Y
(k1)
0 , where Y
(k0)
0 and Y
(k1)
0 denote the values of Y0 corresponding
to the two 16-pixel blocks.
Therefore, if the probability of the two cipher-blocks to be identical is suffi-
ciently large, one may use the distance between them to determine the value
of T and narrow down the search space of K10.
It should be noted that the following two cases can both ensure the require-
ment (B): 1) the sequences {Pj} corresponding to the two blocks are identical;
2) the sequences {Pj} corresponding to the two blocks are different (which may
have t ∈ {0, · · · , 23} identical elements), but the values of Y0 are still identical.
The second case is tightly related to the ratio of 0-bits and 1-bits in B2. As an
extreme example, when B2 = 0 or 2
24−1 (all the bits of B2 are 0 or 1), B2[Pj]
will be fixed to be 0 or 1, respectively. Assuming that the number of 1-bits
in B2 is m, one can easily calculate the probability of B2
[
P
(k0)
j
]
= B2
[
P
(k1)
j
]
to be (m/24)2 + (1 − m/24)2, and then the probability of Y (k0)0 = Y (k1)0 be
PB = ((m/24)
2+(1−m/24)2)24. We have carried out a large number of exper-
iments to verify this theoretical estimation and the results are shown in Fig. 5.
In these experiments, all possible values of B2 were exhaustively generated to
estimate the probability (as the mean value) for min(m, 24 − m) ≤ 4, and(
24
4
)
= 10, 626 random keys were generated for min(m, 24−m) > 4.
242220181614121086420
10−8
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Theoretical value
Experimemtal value
number of 1-bits in B2
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
Y
(k
0
)
0
=
Y
(k
1
)
0
Fig. 5. Probability of Y (k0)0 = Y
(k1)
0 with respect to the number of 1-bits in B2.
Since Prob((k0 − k1) | T ) is 1/T , the final probability that both requirements
hold is PB/T . According to Fig. 5, this probability may be large enough for
an attacker to find some identical blocks in the same set Ij, especially when
min(m, 24−m) and T are both relatively small.
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To show how the attack works, we chose a 512× 512 plain-image in which all
blocks are identical but all pixels in each block are different from each other,
and performed the attack for a secret key K = “2A84BCF35D70664E4740”.
As a result, we found 9 pairs of identical blocks whose indices are listed in
Table 4. Because all these indices should satisfy the requirement (k0−k1) | T ,
we can get an upper bound of T by solving their greatest common divisor of
the differences of the 9 indices. Thus, one immediately gets
gcd(3161− 1941, 7083− 2015, 15255− 3023, 9163− 4159, 12113− 5061,
16355− 5507, 12454− 9166, 12259− 9655, 13102− 11090) = 4.
This means T ∈ {2, 4}, thus immediately leading to gcd(K10, 256) ∈ {128, 64}
and K10 ∈ {64, 128, 192} according to Fact 1. As can be seen, in this example
the size of the subkey space corresponding to K10 is reduced from 256 to 3,
which is quite significant.
Table 4
The indices of 9 pairs of identical blocks in the cipher-image corresponding to the
plain-image of fixed value zero.
k0 1941 2015 3023 4159 5061 5507 9166 9655 11090
k1 3161 7083 15255 9163 12113 16355 12454 12259 13102
3.5 Breaking {Ki mod 128}10i=4 with chosen-plaintext attack
This subsection presents one of the most important results of this work, since
it shows how to partially break the encryption algorithm using a very cost-
effective chosen-plaintext attack, in which 128 or even less plain-images are
created. First, in Sec. 3.5.1 some mathematical devices are introduced. Next,
in Sec. 3.5.2 the steps used to recover subkeys {Ki mod 128}10i=4 are described
in detail. Finally some experimental results are given in Sec. 3.5.3 to validate
the proposed attacks.
3.5.1 Preliminaries
First, we prove some useful properties related to the composite functions Ei(x).
These properties are essential for the attack to be introduced below in this
subsection.
Theorem 1 Let F (x) = G2m+1 ◦ · · · ◦ G1(x) be a composite function defined
over {0, . . . , 2n − 1}, where m,n ∈ Z+, G2i(x) = x ⊕ αi for i = 1 ∼ m,
G2i+1(x) = (x + βi) mod 2
n for i = 0 ∼ m and αi, βi ∈ {0, . . . , 2n − 1}. If
F (x) = x⊕ γ for some γ ∈ {0, . . . , 2n − 1}, then γ ≡⊕mi=1 αi (mod 2n−1).
16
Proof : Let x =
∑n−1
j=0 xj · 2j, αi =
∑n−1
j=0 αi,j · 2j, βi =
∑n−1
j=0 βi,j · 2j, and
F (x) =
∑n−1
j=0 Fj(x) · 2j.
The proof is based on the following fact.
If F verifies F (x) = x⊕γ for some γ = ∑n−1j=0 γj ·2j, then, for any j = 0 ∼ n−1,
the result of the computation of Fj(x) depends only on the value of the j-th
bit of x, that is, xj. In other words, the value of Fj(x) is independent of Fj∗
if j∗ 6= j.
We are going to check the computation of F (x) starting from the least sig-
nificant bit. To get the value of F0(x), we only need to calculate F˜0(x) =
(· · · ((x0 + β0,0) ⊕ α1,0 + β1,0) ⊕ · · · ⊕ αm,0 + βm,0), and then get the least
significant bit of F˜0(x).
2 Note that the carry bit generated in each + op-
eration influences only more significant bits F1(x) ∼ Fn−1(x), and for the
least significant bit of F˜0(x) the operation + is equivalent to ⊕. Therefore,
we immediately get F0(x) = x0 ⊕ β0,0 ⊕ α1,0 ⊕ β1,0 · · · ⊕ αm,0 ⊕ βm,0 =
x0 ⊕ (α1,0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ αm,0)⊕ (β0,0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ βm,0).
Then, let us study how the carry bits generated by + operations in the calcu-
lation on F˜0(x) affect the value of F1(x), as an effort to determine the value
of β0,0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ βm,0. Note the following two facts about carry bits:
• when βi,0 = 0, no carry bit appears for any value of x0;
• when βi,0 = 1, a carry bit appears when x0 = 0 or 1 after the operation
+βi,0, and only for one possible value of x0 there will be a carry bit
3 .
Denoting the number of βi,0 whose value equals to 1 by N0, the above facts
mean that N0 can be obtained by counting carry bits when x0 = 0 and when
x0 = 1. That is, N0 =
∑
x0∈{0,1}N0(x0) = N0(0)+N0(1), where N0(x0) denotes
the number of carry bits generated in the calculation process on F˜0(x) with
respect to x0.
The independence of F1(x) of x0 means that N0(0) = N0(1), and as a result
N0 = N0(0) + N0(1) = 2N0(0) is an even number. This immediately leads to
the conclusion β0,0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ βm,0 = 0. Thus, F0(x) = x0 ⊕ (α1,0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ αm,0).
Next, consider F1(x). In this case, F˜1(x) = (· · · ((x1+β0,1+CB0(x0))⊕α1,1+
β1,1+CB1(x0))⊕· · ·⊕αm,1+βm,1+CBm(x0)), where CBi(x0) denotes the bit
carrying from F˜0(x) during the i-th + operation (which is equal to 0 when a
carry bit does not exist). Then, due to the same reason as in the case of F0(x),
2 Here, + mod 2n is replaced by + in the calculation process, because mod2n does
not affect any bit of F (x).
3 To be more precise, if there is a carry bit when x0 = 0, then there will not be a
carry bit when x0 = 1 and vice versa.
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we have F1(x) = x1⊕(α1,1⊕· · ·⊕αm,1)⊕(β0,1⊕CB0(x0) · · ·⊕βm,1⊕CBm(x0)).
Observing the expression of F˜1(x), we can easily note the following facts:
• when βi,1 = CBi(x0) = 0: no carry bit appears for any value of x1;
• when βi,1 = CBi(x0) = 1: one carry bit always appears for any value of x1;
• when βi,1 = 0, CBi(x0) = 1, or when βi,1 = 1, CBi(x0) = 0: one carry bit
appears for only one value of x1.
As a summary, only one carry bit may be generated from a pair of βi,1 and
CBi(x0), which means that one can consider βi,1 + CBi(x0) as a single value
β∗i,1(x0).
Denoting the number of β∗i,1 whose value equals to 1 by N1(x0), the above
facts imply that N1(x0) =
∑
x1∈{0,1}N1(x0, x1) = N1(x0, 0) +N1(x0, 1), where
N1(x0, x1) means the number of carry bits generated in the calculation pro-
cess on F˜1(x) with respect to x0 and x1. Then, because the value of F2(x)
is independent of x1, we can get N1(x0, 0) = N1(x0, 1) and N1(x0) is even.
This means that β0,1 ⊕ CB0(x0) · · · ⊕ βm,1 ⊕ CBm(x0) = 0 and so F1(x) =
x1 ⊕ (α1,1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ αm,1).
The above deduction can be simply applied to other bits F2(x) ∼ Fn−1(x). As
a result, we get Fi(x) = xi ⊕ (α1,i ⊕ · · · ⊕ αm,i), ∀i = 0 ∼ n− 1.
Finally, combining all the cases together, we have the result that F (x) ≡
x ⊕ (α1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ αm) (mod 2n−1). This means that γ ≡ ⊕mi=1 αi (mod 2n−1)
and the theorem is thus proved. 
Corollary 1 For the image encryption scheme under study, if there exists
γ ∈ {0, . . . , 255} such that Ei(x) = x⊕ γ, then γ ∈ {⊕i αi, (⊕i αi)⊕ 128}.
Proof : Consider the four classes of Ei(x) as shown in Sec. 3.1.
(1) Ei(x) = ((· · · ((xuβ1)⊕α1) · · · )⊕αd(len−1)/2e)uβdlen/2e: From Theorem 1,
one has γ ∈
{⊕d(len−1)/2e
i=1 αi,
(⊕d(len−1)/2e
i=1 αi
)
⊕ 128
}
.
(2) Ei(x) = ((· · · ((x u β1) ⊕ α1) · · · ) u βd(len−1)/2e) ⊕ αdlen/2e: From The-
orem 1, one has αdlen/2e ⊕ γ ∈
{⊕d(len−1)/2e
i=1 αi,
(⊕d(len−1)/2e
i=1 αi
)
⊕ 128
}
,
which means γ ∈
{⊕dlen/2e
i=1 αi,
(⊕dlen/2e
i=1 αi
)
⊕ 128
}
.
(3) Ei(x) = ((· · · ((x⊕ α1)u β1) · · · )⊕ αd(len−1)/2e)u βdlen/2e: Assuming that
x′ = x⊕α1, we have Ei(x) = x⊕γ = x′⊕ (α1⊕γ). Then, applying Theo-
rem 1 on x′, we can easily get α1⊕γ ∈
{⊕d(len−1)/2e
i=2 αi,
(⊕d(len−1)/2e
i=2 αi
)
⊕ 128
}
,
thus γ ∈
{⊕d(len−1)/2e
i=1 αi,
(⊕d(len−1)/2e
i=1 αi
)
⊕ 128
}
.
(4) Ei(x) = ((· · · ((x⊕α1)u β1) · · · )u βd(len−1)/2e)⊕αdlen/2e: Using a similar
process to the above class, one gets γ ∈
{⊕dlen/2e
i=1 αi,
(⊕dlen/2e
i=1 αi
)
⊕ 128
}
.
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The above four conditions together complete the proof of the corollary. 
From Corollary 1 and Eq. (12), we get the following result:
γ mod 128 =
⊕
i
αi mod 128 ∈ A∗ = {x mod 128|x ∈ A ∪ {0}}. (18)
Assuming that a∗0 = a0 mod 128 and a
∗
1 = a1 mod 128, we have
A∗ = {0, 127, a∗0, a∗1, a∗0 ⊕ 127, a∗1 ⊕ 127, a∗0 ⊕ a∗1, a∗0 ⊕ a∗1 ⊕ 127}. (19)
Observing the above equation, we can easily notice the following facts:
(1) when a∗0 = a
∗
1 ∈ {0, 127}, #(A∗) = 2;
(2) when a∗0 ∈ {0, 127} and a∗1 6∈ {0, 127} (or a∗1 ∈ {0, 127} and a∗0 6∈ {0, 127}),
#(A∗) = 4;
(3) when a∗0, a
∗
1 6∈ {0, 127} and a∗0 ⊕ a∗1 ∈ {0, 127}, #(A∗) = 4;
(4) when a∗0, a
∗
1 6∈ {0, 127} and a∗0 ⊕ a∗1 6∈ {0, 127}, #(A∗) = 8.
Apparently, if we can get the set A∗, it will be possible to get the values of a∗0
and a∗1. The complexity of such a process is summarized as follows:
(1) when #(A∗) = 2, there are only 2 possible values of (a∗0, a∗1): (0,127) or
(127,0);
(2) when #(A∗) = 4, assuming that A∗ = {0, 127, a, a ⊕ 127}, there are 8
possible values of (a∗0, a
∗
1): (0, a), (0, a ⊕ 127), (127, a), (127, a ⊕ 127),
(a, a), (a, a⊕ 127), (a⊕ 127, a), (a⊕ 127, a⊕ 127);
(3) when #(A∗) = 8, there are 24 possible values of (a∗0, a∗1): a∗0 ∈ A∗/{0, 127}
and a∗1 ∈ A∗/{0, 127, a∗0, a∗0 ⊕ 127}.
One can see that in any case the complexity is much smaller than 27×27 = 214,
the complexity of exhaustively searching all the bits of a∗0 and a
∗
1. This idea is
the key for the chosen-plaintext attack proposed in this subsection.
Next, let us find out how to distinguish XOR-equivalent encryption functions.
According to Proposition 3, one can achieve such a goal by checking the fol-
lowing 255 equalities: F (x1)⊕ F (x1 ⊕ i) = i, where x1 is an arbitrary integer
in {0, . . . , 255} and i = 1 ∼ 255.
Proposition 3 Let F (x) be a function defined over {0, . . . , 2n − 1}, where
n ∈ Z+. Then, F (x) = x ⊕ γ for any x ∈ {0, . . . , 2n − 1} if and only if
the following requirement holds: there exists x1 ∈ {0, . . . , 2n − 1} such that
F (x1)⊕ F (x1 ⊕ i) = i,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 2n − 1}.
Proof : The “only if” part is obvious. Now, let us prove the “if” part. Note
that F (x1) ⊕ F (x1 ⊕ i) = i also holds when i = 0. So, when i = x ⊕ x1, we
have F (x1 ⊕ x ⊕ x1) = F (x) = F (x1) ⊕ x ⊕ x1 = x ⊕ (x1 ⊕ F (x1)). When
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i = x1, we have F (x1) ⊕ F (x1 ⊕ x1) = x1 and then get x1 ⊕ F (x1) = F (0).
Therefore, F (x) = x⊕ F (0), where F (0) = γ is a fixed value. 
For the encryption functions Ei(x) composed of ⊕ and u, the above result can
be further simplified. From Proposition 4, it is enough to check the following
127 equalities: F (x1) ⊕ F (x1 ⊕ d) = d, where x1 is an arbitrary integer in
{0, . . . , 255} and d ∈ {1, · · · , 127}.
Proposition 4 Consider any encryption function Ei(x) (i = 1 ∼ 3) defined
in Eqs. (4)∼(6). If there exists x1 ∈ {0, . . . , 255} such that Ei(x1) ⊕ Ei(x1 ⊕
d) = d, ∀d ∈ {1, . . . , 127}, then Ei(x) = x⊕ Ei(0).
Proof : From Fact 3, one has Ei(x1)⊕Ei(x1⊕128) = 128 and Ei(x1)⊕Ei(x1⊕
j ⊕ 128) = j ⊕ 128 for j = 1 ∼ 127. This means that Ei(x1)⊕ Ei(x1 ⊕ j) = j
holds ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , 255}. Then, from Proposition 3, Ei(x) = x⊕ Ei(0). 
Next, let us investigate the probability that a given encryption Ei(x) is equiv-
alent to x ⊕ γ. Again, because the theoretical analysis is quite difficult, we
carried out a number of random experiments with a 512× 512 plain-image for
different values of K10, where K1 ∼ K9 were generated at random. Generally
speaking, this probability becomes smaller when K10 increases, but it fluctu-
ates in a wide range for different values of K1 · · ·K9. Two typical examples
are shown in Fig. 6, in which the XOR-equivalent encryption functions in-
volving the second kind of encryption subfunctions (i.e., functions of the form
x u β) and those not involving these encryption subfunctions were counted
separately.
1 32 64 96 128 160 192 224 255
100
101
102
104
106
 
 
Not involving x+˙β
Involving x+˙β
a)
1 32 64 96 128 160 192 224 255
100
101
102
104
106
 
 
Not involving x+˙β
Involving x+˙β
b)
Fig. 6. The number of pixels satisfying E1(x) = x ⊕ γ under different values of
K10: a) K1 ∼ K9 = “8DB87A1613D75ADF2D”; b) K1 ∼ K9 = “2A84BCF35
D70664347”.
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3.5.2 Description of the attack
Based on the above discussions, a chosen-plaintext attack can be developed
by choosing 128 plain-images {Il}127l=0 of size M × N as follows: Il = I0 ⊕ l, 4
where I0 can be freely chosen. To facilitate the following description about the
attack, denote the encryption function Ei(x) corresponding to the j-th pixel
of the k-th block by Ei,k,j(x), and the parameters a0, a1 corresponding to the
k-th block by a0,i,k, a1,i,k, respectively. Similarly, for each updated subkey Kj,
the value corresponding to the k-th block is denoted by Kj,k. Then, according
to the discussion in Sec. 3.2.6, we have the following:
Fact 4 Given two XOR-equivalent encryption functions Ei,k1,j1(x) = x⊕γk1,j1
and Ei,k2,j2(x) = x⊕ γk2,j2, if k1 ≡ k2 (mod T/2), then γk1 ≡ γk2 (mod 128).
The proposed chosen-plaintext attack works in the following steps.
Step 1 – Finding XOR-equivalent encryption functions
For each color channel, scan the 128 plain-images to find encryption functions
Ei,k,j that are equivalent to x⊕ γk, where γk = Ei,k,j(0) (according to Propo-
sition 4). Record all the XOR-equivalent encryption functions corresponding
to each color channel in an Si× 2 matrix Ai, where Si denotes the number of
blocks containing such encryption functions. The first and the second rows of
Ai contain the block indices and the corresponding values of γk, respectively.
Here, note that all XOR-equivalent encryption functions in the same block are
identical, since they share the same parameters a0,i,k and a1,i,k.
The output of this step is composed of three matrices {Ai}1≤i≤3, which require∑3
i=1 2Si memory units.
Step 2 – Estimating A∗i,k (for each guessed value of K10)
Exhaustively search the value ofK10 and get the period T = 256/ gcd(K10, 256).
Then, for each matrix Ai, generate the following T/2 sets:
{
A˜i,k
}T/2−1
k=0
, where
A˜i,k = {Ai(s, 2) mod 128|s ≡ k (mod T/2)}. Next, expand each A˜i,k to con-
struct A˜∗i,k =
{
x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3
∣∣∣ x1, x2, x3 ∈ A˜i,k ∪ {0, 127}}, which is an approx-
imation of the following set:
A∗i,k = {0, 127, a∗0,i,k, a∗1,i,k, a∗0,i,k⊕127, a∗1,i,k⊕127, a∗0,i,k⊕a∗1,i,k, a∗0,i,k⊕a∗1,i,k⊕127},
where a∗0,i,k = (a0,i,0 + k · K10) mod 128 and a∗1,i,k = (a1,i,0 + k · K10) mod
128. Note that a0,i,0 and a1,i,0 are the two subkeys corresponding to the color
channel in question.
4 In this paper, we use Il = I0 ⊕ l to denote the following facts: ∀i = 0 ∼MN − 1,
Rl(i) = R0(i)⊕ l, Gl(i) = G0(i)⊕ l and Bl(i) = B0(i)⊕ l.
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Then, if there exists k ∈ {0, · · · , T/2− 1} such that #
(
A˜∗i,k
)
6∈ {2, 4, 8}, one
can immediately conclude that the current value of K10 is wrong and then
remove it from the list of candidate values for K10.
The output of this step includes a list of n ≤ 256 candidate values of K10 and
at most 3T/2 sets {A˜i,k} 1≤i≤3
0≤k≤T/2−1
for each candidate value of K10. The total
number of memory units required is not greater than 6 × 3nT/2 = 9nT ≤
9 × 256 × 256 ≈ 219.2, which is practical for a PC to store the intermediate
data. Here, note that 0 and 127 are always in A∗, so they do not need to be
kept.
Step 3 – Determining {Ki mod 128}10i=4
For each color channel, choosing the set A˜∗i,k0 of the greatest size
5 , one can
exhaustively search all possible values of (a∗0,i,k0 , a
∗
1,i,k0
), i.e., search all possible
values of a∗0,i,0 = (a
∗
0,i,k0
− k0 ·K10) mod 128 and a∗1,i,0 = (a∗1,i,k0 − k0 ·K10) mod
128. Note that a∗0,1,0 = K4 mod 128 and a
∗
1,1,0 = K7 mod 128 (red channel),
a∗0,2,0 = K5 mod 128 and a
∗
1,2,0 = K8 mod 128 (green channel), a
∗
0,3,0 = K6 mod
128 and a∗1,3,0 = K9 mod 128 (blue channel).
All the guessed values of (a∗0,i,0, a
∗
1,i,0) are verified by employing the relationship
between A∗i,k0 and other sets {A∗i,k}k 6=k0 . If all possible values of (a∗0,i,0, a∗1,i,0)
are eliminated, the current value of K10 can also be eliminated. Note that
the other three values of a valid candidate (a∗0,i,0, a
∗
1,i,0 ⊕ 128, K10 mod 128) =
(u, v, w) will also pass the verification process due to Fact 5 below: (u⊕127, v⊕
127, 128− w), (v, u, w), and (v ⊕ 127, u⊕ 127, 128− w).
Fact 5 Given x, a, c ∈ {0, · · · , 127}, x + ac ≡ (x ⊕ 127 + (128 − a)c) ⊕ 127
(mod 128).
The output of this step is a list of candidate values of
K∗ = (K4 mod 128, · · · , K9 mod 128, K10 mod 128).
In the worst case, the number of all possible values is N × 243 ≤ 256 ×
243 = 3538944 ≈ 221.6, which is still much smaller than the number of all
possible values of the subkey K∗: 26×7+8 = 250. In the best case, the number
of candidate values is only 2× 23 = 16 (according to Fact 5).
5 The greatest size may be 8, 4 or 2. When it is 4 or 2, A˜∗i,k0 may not be a good
estimation of A∗i,k0 and as a result cannot be used to support the attack. This case
often occurs when K10 is relatively large, thus leading to a very small occurrence
probability of XOR-equivalent encryption functions (see Fig. 6).
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3.5.3 Experimental Results
To validate the feasibility of the above attack, we have carried out a real attack
with a randomly-generated secret key K = “2A84BCF25E6A664E4C41”. As
a result, we got the following output from Step 2:
K10 ∈ {1, 3, · · · , 255},
A∗0,6= {0, 127, 108, 20, 7, 107, 120, 108},
A∗0,28= {0, 127, 115, 125, 14, 0, 12, 113},
A∗0,79= {0, 127, 116, 117, 1, 10, 11, 126},
A∗1,19= {0, 127, 16, 33, 49, 111, 94, 78},
A∗1,28= {0, 127, 106, 122, 21, 5, 111, 16},
A∗2,7= {0, 127, 19, 78, 108, 49, 34, 93},
A∗2,18= {0, 127, 34, 93, 3, 33, 124, 94}.
The final output of the attack (i.e., the output of Step 3) is shown in Table 5.
Finally, note that one may also be able to distinguish some XOR-equivalent
encryption functions even with less than 128 chosen plain-images. To inves-
tigate such a possibility, we have carried out some experiments by choosing
the following (n + 1) < 128 plain-images instead: {Il}nl=0, where Il = I0 ⊕ l
for any l > 0. Let N(n) be the number of XOR-equivalent encryption func-
tions detected with the above n + 1 chosen plain-images. The ratio r(n) =
N(127)/N(n) gives an estimation of the probability that a detected XOR-
equivalent encryption function is real. For three randomly-generated keys, the
values of r(n) with respect to different values of n are shown in Fig. 7, from
which one can see that the value of r(n) always increases significantly when
n increases from 2i − 1 to 2i (i = 1 ∼ 6). We also carried out experiments
for other random keys, and found out that this fact holds for most of them.
According to this experimental result, we can choose the following 13 plain-
images to minimize the number of chosen plaintexts: I0, I1 = I0⊕1, I2 = I0⊕2,
I3 = I0 ⊕ 3, I4 = I0 ⊕ 4, I5 = I0 ⊕ 7, I6 = I0 ⊕ 8, I7 = I0 ⊕ 15, I8 = I0 ⊕ 16,
I9 = I0 ⊕ 31, I10 = I0 ⊕ 32, I11 = I0 ⊕ 63 and I12 = I0 ⊕ 64. Then, for 1,000
randomly-generated secret keys, our experiments show that the average value
of r∗ = N(127)/N∗ is about 0.825, where N∗ denotes the number of detected
XOR-equivalent encryption functions with the 13 chosen plain-images. Note
that the value of r∗ is not accurate when N∗ is too small. If only those keys
corresponding to N∗ ≥ 100 are considered, the average value of r∗ increases
to about 0.9234. If only those corresponding to N(n) ≥ 1000 are counted,
the average value of r∗ becomes about 0.9826. In practice, one may have to
use more than 13 chosen plain-images to run the proposed attack, but it is
expected that O(20) chosen plain-images are enough in most cases.
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Table 5
The final output of a real attack, where the underlined data form the real values of
{Ki mod 128}10i=4.
K10 mod 128
{Ki mod 128}9i=4
i = 4 i = 7 i = 5 i = 8 i = 6 i = 9
63
25 13
33 49
51 21
21 51
49 33
51 21
21 51
13 25
33 49
51 21
21 51
49 33
51 21
21 51
65
102 114
94 78
76 106
106 76
78 94
76 106
106 76
114 102
94 78
76 106
106 76
78 94
76 106
106 76
1  2 4 8 16 32 64 127
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
n
Fig. 7. The values of r(n) with respect to different values of n = 1 ∼ 127, where the
three lines correspond to the results of three randomly-generated keys.
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3.6 Known-plaintext attack based on a masking image
According to the results shown in Fig. 6, we know that many encryption
functions are equivalent to XOR operations. Therefore, if we consider all
the encryption functions as XOR-equivalent ones, then a masking image can
be obtained by simply XORing a known plain-image and the corresponding
cipher-image pixel by pixel. By using this masking image as an equivalent
of the secret key to decrypt other cipher-images, all the pixels encrypted by
real XOR-equivalent encryption functions will be correctly recovered. If the
number of such correctly-recovered pixels is sufficiently large, some visual in-
formation about the plain-images may be obtained. It is expected that this
known-plaintext attack can work well when K10 is relatively small. Figure 8
shows two examples of this attack when K10 = 6 and 30, from which one can
see that some important visual information about the plain-image is revealed.
a) b)
Fig. 8. The result of breaking a plain-image “Peppers” with a mask-
ing image obtained when “Lenna” (Fig. 4a) is the known plain-image: a)
K = “8DB87A1613D75ADF2D06”; b) K = “8DB87A1613D75ADF2D1E”.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, the security of a recently-proposed image encryption scheme
has been analyzed in detail. It is found that there exists a number of invalid
keys, weak keys and partially equivalent keys, which reduce the size of the
key space. Some attacks to a number of subkeys have also been developed: 1)
given a chosen plain-image, a subkey K10 can be guessed with a complexity
less than 28; 2) part of the key may be recovered with a chosen-plaintext
attack using at most 128 chosen plain-images. The scheme under study can
also be broken with only one known plain-image, when the subkey K10 is
small. In addition, some other insecure problems about the scheme have been
discussed throughout. The cryptanalysis presented in this paper shed some
new light on attacking other encryption schemes that are composed of multi-
round encryption functions, a relatively difficult but important topic to be
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further investigated in the near future.
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